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HUMAN GENE PATENTS: PROOF OF PROBLEMS?
TIMOTHY CAULFIELD*

INTRODUCTION

Despite being common practice since the 1980s, I the idea of patenting
human genes continues to stir controversy. It has been the subject not only
of innumerable policy reports but also, in some jurisdictions, of intense
media scrutiny, most of it negative. 2 And, if you believe the opinion research, the general public is not crazy about the idea of gene patenting either. Indeed, it would appear that the more people learn about
3
biotechnology patents, the less fond they grow of them.
Is this skepticism justified? What are the social issues associated with
human gene patents and is there evidence to support purported concerns? In
this paper, I explore two of the most commonly stated worries associated
with gene patents. While the patenting of biological material has long
caused ethical angst, the suggestions that patents will hurt scientific
progress and limit access to useful health technologies have had the greatest policy traction. 4 Moral questions about the acceptability of patenting
"life" remain, 5 and there are still debates about the legal patentability of
* Canada Research Chair in Health Law and Policy, Professor, Faculty of Law and School of
Public Health, Research Director, Health Law Institute, University of Alberta. Thanks to Laura Geddes
and Ubaka Ogbogu for their assistance. A special thanks to the wonderful and insightful research
support provided by CJ Murdoch and Julie Burger. The research was funded by the Stem Cell Network
and Genome Canada.
1. The first human gene patent was issued in 1982, U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499. Stephen Petrina et
al., Technology and Rights, 14 INT'L J. TECH. & DESIGN EDUC. 181, 199 (2004); STEPHEN PETRNA,
CHANGE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY

STATES: A RESOURCE

BOOK FOR STUDYING THE

49 (2004), available at http://teched.vt.edu/ctte/ Im-

agesPDFs/Petrina.Change.TechlnUS.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Robert Benzie, Ontario to Defy US. Patents on Cancer Genes, NAT'L POST (Can.),
Sept. 20, 2001, at Al 5; Scott Foster, Gene Patent Fight Imperils Health-CareSystem, EDMONTON J.,
Aug. 24, 2001, at Al. For an analysis of the media coverage of human gene patents, see Timothy
Caulfield et al., Myriad and the Mass Media: The Coveringof a Gene Patent Controversy, 9 GENETICS
MED. 850 (2007).
3. Edna F. Einsiedel, Patents in the Public Sphere: Public Perceptions and Biotechnology Patents, in EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: FROM HINDSIGHT TO FORESIGHT 102 (Edna F. Einsidel ed., 2009).
4. See e.g., Timothy Caulfield et al., PatentingHuman Genetic Material:Refocusing the Debate,
I NATURE REvIEwS: GENETICS 227 (2000).
5. See, e.g., DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING
(2004); Timothy Caulfield & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy Making in the
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genes, 6 but these two practical concerns are the most effective issues in
actually mobilizing policy makers. 7 For example, the recently proposed
Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, 8 a law that seeks to ban gene
patents, is justified by one of its sponsors, Congressman Weldon, on the
grounds that "[t]he practice of gene patenting is preventing critical research
from advancing because scientists are wary of trespassing patent laws." 9
Although recognizing that there are myriad other social concerns associated with gene patents,' 0 this brief comment will focus on these two
policy issues, the ideas that patents hurt basic research and limit access to
useful technologies. Specifically, I am interested in what the available empirical data can tell us. Does the evidence, which is mounting but remains
less than robust, support the speculation about the undesirable social repercussions of gene patenting? Is the evidence clear enough to support policy
action?
This paper starts with a review of the specific social concerns and the
most salient evidence presently available. We will see that, particularly for
concerns regarding an adverse impact on research, the evidence is, at best,
equivocal.11 Given this reality, what is the role of evidence in the context
Biotechnology Era?, 7 NATURE REV. GENETICS 72 (2006); Gerald Dworkin, Should There Be Property
Rights in Genes?, 352 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y B 1077 (1997); David B. Resnik, DNA
Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152 (2001) [hereinafter Resnik, DNA Patents]. See
alsco DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, PATENTING HUMAN GENES AND STEM CELLS: A REPORT 69 (2004),

available at http://www.etiskraad.dk/graphics/03 -udgivelser/engeske-pubikatiner/patenting-human
-genes/patents04/patenting-human-genes.pdf (suggesting that treating the human body or parts of it as
a mere commodity promotes a lack of respect for human life, or as stated by The Danish Council on
Ethics, amounts to the "impermissible reduction of something vested with its own sovereign integrity.").
6. See, e.g., Dianne Nicol, On the Legality of Gene Patents, 29 Melb. U. L. Rev. 809 (2005).
While this patentability debate will likely continue, it has never had a serious impact on the issuance of
patents on human genes. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron X. Fellmeth, Patent Law: Natural Substances and Patentable Inventions, 300 SCIENCE 1375, 1375 (2003) ("The [United States] Patent and
Trademark Office and federal courts now routinely hold discovered natural substances patentable if
they are 'isolated and purified' or otherwise insubstantially modified. Naturally occurring DNA and
protein biomolecules have, consequently, become the subject of patent applications.").
7. Numerous commentators have noted the dominance of these two issues.
See, e.g., Birgit
Verbeure et al., Analysing DNA Patents in Relation with Diagnostic Genetic Testing, 14 EUR. J. HUM.
GENETICS 26 (2006) at 26-27. See generally Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An
Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1092-93 (2006) (for a
discussion of the issues which have mobilized policy makers).
8. H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
9. Press Release, Xavier Becerra, Reps. Becerra & Weldon Introduce Bill to Ban the Practice of
Gene Patenting (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://becerra.house.gov/HoR/CA3 I/News/Press+Releases/
2007/02-09-07+REPS+BECERRA+WELDON+INTRODUCE+BILL+TO+BAN+THE+PRACTICE+
OF+GENE+PATENTING.htm.
10. See e.g., Pilar N. Ossorio, The Human Genome As Common Heritage: Common Sense Or
Legal Nonsense?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425 (2007) (providing a discussion and critique of the idea
that the human genome is common heritage of humanity, and thus should not be patentable).
1I. Indeed, it has been noted that although policy reports often report the existence of these prob-
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of patent policy? The paper concludes with a discussion of several issues
relevant to the interpretation of existing and emerging data.
I.

PATENTS HURT GENETIC RESEARCH

There are thousands of human gene patents in existence 12 and many
more applications pending. Might this sea of intellectual property make it
more difficult and costly to do basic research? Might patents hurt the innovation process? From a science policy perspective, this concern is particularly problematic. If true, it cuts against one of the explicit rationales of
patents: the stimulation of innovation.
From the early days of patent law, the stated goal of awarding a stateimposed monopoly was to encourage innovation for the benefit of society.

Throughout his career, Thomas Jefferson, often viewed as one the fathers
of the American patent system, continually questioned the social utility of
patents, believing that ideas and invention "should freely spread from one

to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of
man .... ,,13 Ultimately, he came to believe that patents could stimulate
innovation and, therefore, in the aggregate, they were socially beneficial.
But, as Thomas Jewett points out, for Jefferson, "the purpose of the patent

office was to promulgate invention, not protect them." 14
When evaluating the impact and value of patents, we should not lose
sight of this perceived foundational social purpose. However, against this

historical justification for the patent system, it must also be recognized that
there is, in fact, little empirical data to support the idea that patents are

lems, the assertions are rarely based on hard evidence. See, Verbeure et al., supra note 7, at 27 (noting
that "no in-depth data are available yet on the scope and effective characteristics of the problem described. Most of the reports contain only anecdotal evidence to support their conclusions, probably
because broadly based evidence is not readily available."). See also Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence
and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091,
1092-93 (2006).
12. Over 40,000 patents have been issued, covering more than 20% of the extant human genome.
NAT'L RESEARCH

COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 101-02 (Stephen A. Merrill &

Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006); Fiona Murray & Scott Stem, Do Formal Intellectual PropertyRights
Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63
J. ECON. BEHAV. ORGAN. 648 (2007).
13. Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 629, 630 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
14. Thomas 0. Jewett, Thomas Jefferson: The Father of Invention, EARLY AM. REV., Winter
2000, http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/winter2000/jefferson.html. However, it must be noted that
Jefferson's philosophy with respect to and personal impact on patent law were both complex. For an
intricate examination of the Jeffersonian perspective, see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
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required for the innovation process. As noted by Richard Gold, "despite the
assumption within intellectual property systems that they are necessary to
encourage research and development, there is only a modest body of empir15
ical evidence to support this in the biotechnology industry."'
However, for the purposes of this paper, let us assume that patents are
an asset to the innovation process. At a minimum, this is certainly the view
held by the industry and many within the scientific community, 16 and regardless of the evidence on their positive social influence, if patents stifle
innovation, this would cut against the core justification for the existence of
the patent regime. 17 A 1998 paper by Heller and Eisenberg crystallized this
concern by suggesting that gene patents hurt research by making it difficult
to acquire the rights to all necessary research inputs. This difficulty could,
in turn, result in underuse of valuable technologies or even the obstruction
of potentially important research. They called this policy dilemma the "tragedy of the anti-commons."' 18 Since the publication of the Heller and Eisenberg paper, this concern has appeared in some form in almost every
relevant policy document. 19
But what does the evidence tell us? Do human gene patents hurt upstream innovation? While most research on point is not tremendously robust (for example, much of it consists in survey data on the perceptions of
the scientific community), there is at present no strong evidence that the
"anti-commons" concern has had a major impact on the research communi15. E. Richard Gold et al., Needed: Models of Biotechnology Intellectual Property, 20 TRENDS
BIOTECH. 327, 327 (2002); E. Richard Gold, FindingCommon Cause in the PatentDebate, 18 NATURE
BIOTECH. 1217, 1218 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Robert M. Cook-Deegan & Stephen J. McCormack, Intellectual Property: Patents,
Secrecy and DNA, 293 SCIENCE 217 (2001); Joseph Straus, BargainingAround the TRIPS Agreement:
The Casefor Ongoing Public-PrivateInitiatives to FacilitateWorldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 91 (1998). This also seems to be the perception of researchers. In a
recent survey of the Canadian stem cell research community, almost all of those surveyed identified the
development of beneficial products and services for society as a very important or important social goal
and approximately three-quarters considered the role of patents in facilitating research translation to be
important or very important. Timothy Caulfield et al., Patents, Commercialization and the Canadian
Stem Cell Research Community, 3 REGENERATIVE MED. 483,485 (2008).
17. While gene patenting is the focus of this piece, this concern is not restricted to this context.
See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395 (2006).
18. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
19. See, for example, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21 ST CENTURY 71 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) stating that:
In a 1998 Science article, attorney Michael Heller and legal scholar Rebecca Eisenberg hypothesized the emergence of what they termed an "anticommons" in biotechnology, which
could result if assembling the rights to use the numerous separate patented building blocks
necessary to pursue a particular line of research or product development proved to be prohibitively costly and time consuming or simply impossible, causing a promising prospect to be
avoided or abandoned.
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ty. In 2006, our research team conducted a systematic review of all available data, with particular emphasis on the data and studies used in policy
reports. We concluded that the effects predicted by the anti-commons hypothesis are not borne out in the available data. 2 0 For example, a 2005
study by Walsh, et al. for the National Academy of Sciences found that
only 1% of the scientists surveyed reported suffering a project delay of
1
more than 1 month due to patents. 2
Shortly after the publication of our paper, the American Association
for the Advancement of Science released a major study surveying the international research community that came to a similar conclusion. 2 2 The report notes explicitly that the data "offer very little evidence of an
'anticommons problem."' 23 The authors conclude that research results
suggest, at least for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany,
that:
IP-protected technologies remain relatively accessible to the broad scientific community, and not as constrained by IP protections as many have
cautioned. In the case of research tools, the majority were transferred rather quickly, taking less than a month to obtain. Most research tools were
licensed nonexclusively in all employment
sectors, allowing them to re24
main accessible to multiple parties.
Emerging research continues to buttress these findings-often by using a variety of methodologies. 25 For example, a 2005 study by Murray and
20. Caulfield et al.,
supra note 11, at 1092.
21. JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS
IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 2 (2005). Another one of our more recent studies involved a survey of the
Canadian stem cell research community. We found very similar results to the Walsh study. Though the
sample size was small, and it was in the context of stem cell research, the results are worth mentioning
as the study captured leading Canadian researchers and fits well with the other data in the area. Of the
twenty-seven investigators that responded, only two had been refused a license. Both of these investigators proceeded with the work without obtaining a license. See Caulfield et al., supranote 16, at 486.
22. AM. ASS'N. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXPERIENCES: A REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES 23 (2007).
23. Id. at 12. Specifically, the report related the following regarding the US and Japan data:
Of those 107 respondents to the question about difficulties with technology acquisition, [2%]
reported that their research was delayed, [6%] reported that they had to change a research
project, and one respondent ([1%] of those who acquired technology-or 0.1% of the whole
sample) reported abandoning a research project. Thus, although there is some concern that the
cost of patented technologies might be too high, the vast majority of researchers largely have
been unaffected by others' patented technologies.
Id. The data from the UK was somewhat less clear, but still the authors concluded that "respondents
who reported acquiring IP were most likely to report that they did not experience any problems during
that process as well." Id. In Germany, the numbers reporting possible anti-commons problems were the
highest, but still were only listed at 23%. Id. at 13.
24. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). For Japan, the conclusions were even stronger. "For the Japan
survey results indicated that despite the increasingly pro-IP environment for Japanese university and
public sector researchers, there is little evidence that patents are interfering with research." Id. at 14.
25. See, for example, a news report on a recent conference where Robert Cook-Deegan reports on
research by his team concerning the lack of evidence regarding the impact of gene patents in this re-
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Stem explored the relationship between patents and associated publications. Specifically, they were looking to see if patents influenced publication. Interestingly, they did find an "anti-commons" effect, such that the
number of publications decline slightly after the granting of a patent (suggesting that the patents have an impact on knowledge distribution), but the
effect was small enough to ameliorate at least some public policy con26
cems.
To be fair, all of these studies can be critiqued on various grounds,
such as sample size, using an inappropriate comparator technology, and the
exploration of perceptions rather than actual, objectively determined, effects. 27 However, taken as a whole, they paint a fairly consistent picture.
And, at a minimum, given the vast number of gene patents the effects are
much less prevalent than would be expected if the hypothesized mechanisms of the anticommons were in fact operating. Surely, if patents caused a
problem warranting immediate policy action, there would be some clear,
discemable, effect. Naturally, this absence of evidence has been noted by
other scholars, such as Holman: "The paucity of documented examples in
which the fears surrounding gene patents have manifested themselves is
striking, particularly when one considers the high level of public concern
'28
and the extraordinary nature of the proposed legislative fix."
In sum, "despite the large number of patents and numerous, heterogeneous actors-including large pharmaceutical firms, biotech startups, universities and governments-studies that have examined the incidence of
anticommons problems find them relatively uncommon."'29 It should be
noted, however, that there has been some speculation that gene patenting
spect:
Comparing the number of literature citations for three 'seminal technologies' commonly used
in molecular biology laboratories-one patented, two unpatented-Cook-Deegan said, 'The
thing to notice here is you can't really tell the difference too much in the adoption of these
technologies. So if your theory is, "if something's patented, nobody gets to use it"--wrong.'
Shawna Williams, Genetics Perspectives on Policy Seminar - Who Owns Your Genes? Intellectual
Property and the Human Genome, GENETICS

AND

PUB.

POL'Y

CENTER,

July

10,

2007,

http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.past.php?action=detail&past-eventid=41.
26. Murray & Stem, supra note 12 at, 648.
27. In addition, much of the referenced data does not address the impact of patents on down
stream research, such as the development of new diagnostic approaches. See, e.g., Fabienne Orsi &
Benjamin Coriat, Are 'Strong Patents' Beneficial to Innovative Activities? Lessons from the Genetic
Testingfor Breast Cancer Controversies,14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1205, 1206 (2005).

28. Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A
Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REv. 295, 300 (2007). See also Verbeure et al.,
supra note 7, at 27 and accompanying quote, supra note 11. For a discussion of the anti-commons
phenomenon in the context of nutrigenomics, see David Castle, Intellectual Propertyand Nutrigenomics. 16 HEALTH L. REv. 58 (2008). Castle concludes that while it is early, there is no evidence that gene
patents have impeded nutrigenomic research. Id. at 62.
29. Caulfield et al., supranote 11.
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strategies are starting to become more targeted on "inventions" that are
more likely to have certain market value-in other words, on patents with a
clear utility and commercial potential. As noted by Pressman et al.: "Patent
prosecution, maintenance and management costs-estimated by respondents at between $20,000 and $30,000 per patent-militate against patenting inventions that are unlikely to recover those costs, and encourage
greater selectivity in what gets patented."'30 This change in strategy may
result in more aggressive protection of patents (if they are viewed as more
valuable, they may be viewed as worth protecting), thus raising the possibility of an increase in the anticommons effect. 31 There is, as of now, no
evidence to support this interesting speculation.
II.

PATENTS HURT CLINICAL CARE AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS

The concern that patents hurt access to clinically useful technologies
has also been around for over a decade. 3 2 Patents grant a limited monopoly,
allowing the patent holder to decide the price and conditions of access. As
noted above, this is the social trade-off inherent in the patent system. As
such, it seems reasonable to predict that patents could result in restrictions
on utilization, even utilization that is socially beneficial. This concern was
amplified in the summer of 2001 when Myriad Genetics sought to aggressively enforce its patents on the BRCA1/2 gene mutations. 33 And survey
research has shown that the public is especially concerned about the impact
34
of patents on access.

However, again, the empirical evidence exploring the access concern
is less than ideal. 35 In fact, given the profile of the concern and the large
amount of policy activity, there is surprisingly little research on point. And

30. Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 39 (2006). See also Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting:
The End of an Era? 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 185 (2007).
31. Ann E. Mills & Patti M. Tereskerz, Changing Patent Strategies: What Will They Mean for the
Industry?, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 867, 867 (2007).
32. For a general discussion of the issues, see Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma:
Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65 (2002); Timothy Caulfield et al., Genetic Technologies, Health Care Policy and the Patent Bargain, 63 CLINICAL
GENETICS 15 (2002).
33. Timothy Caulfield, Policy Conflicts: Gene Patents and Health Care in Canada, 8
COMMUNITY GENETICS 223, 224 (2005).
34. POLLARA RES. & EARNSCLIFFE RES. & COMM., PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH INTO
BIOTECHNOLOGY ISSUES: SEVENTH WAVE REPORT - EXECUTIVE REPORT (2002).

35. Given the limited scope of this paper, I do not touch here on the important research regarding
the impact of patents on access in developing countries. See, e.g., Amir Attaran, How Do Patents and
Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS
155 (2004).
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the data that is available is largely research on mere perceptions of impact
and is limited to the specific context of diagnostic testing. Even so, this
data does suggest that those providing genetic tests believe that patents are
having an adverse impact on what is available. The oft-referenced study by
Cho, et al. for instance, found that 25% of respondents (136 lab directors)
reported having stopped offering a clinical genetic test because of a patent
or license, while 53% reported deciding not to develop a new clinical genetic test for that reason. 3 6 Other studies have come to similar conclusions. 37 Likewise, some studies have suggested that the monopoly
conferred by the patent creates significant cost inefficiencies for health care
systems. A French study by Sevilla et al. for instance, concludes that "gene
patents with a very broad scope, covering all potential medical applications, may prevent health care systems from identifying and adopting the
most efficient genetic testing strategies due to the monopoly granted for the
''3 8
exploitation of the gene.
III.

REFLECTING ON THE EVIDENCE

Thus, while there is data suggesting that gene patents may affect
access, utilization and costs, the studies available are relatively few in
number and of limited methodological strength. 39 But even if we do accept
the general themes emerging from this data (which, to me, makes intuitive
sense), the fact that access/cost issues are a cause for concern at all raises
some particularly challenging policy dilemmas. Arguably, enabling control
of access and creating exclusive, specialized markets that result in premium
prices is precisely what patents are supposed to do in a world of commercialized medicine, quite separately from whether this is held to be ethically
praiseworthy or not. 40 It is this exclusivity that is intended to be the incen36. Mildred K. Cho etal., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003).

37. See, e.g., Jon Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patentsare Illustrated by the Case of Haemocrhmatosis,415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002); Christine Sevilla et al., Impact
of Gene Patentson the Cost-Effective Delivery of Care: The Case of BRCA I Genetic Testing, 19 INT'L.
J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 287, 289 (2003); Orsi & Coriat, supra note 27.
38. Christine Sevilla et al., supra note 37, at 288. See also, Orsi & Coriat, supra note 27. As
further evidence of this effect, a commentary accompanying a recent scientific study claims that some
clinicians have chosen to pursue some applied research because of the impact of gene patents. If this is
the case, their area of work would itself be evidence of the impact of gene patents on access. Brian
Goldman, HER2 Testing: The Patent "Genee " is Out of the Bottle, 176 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1443,
1443 (2007) ("One can argue that the study by Dendukuri and colleagues in this issue of CMAJ [] is
necessary only because patenting issues have made the drug so expensive."). The study to which Goldman refers is Nandini Dendukuri et al., Testingfor HER2-Positive Breast Cancer: A Systematic Review
and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 176 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1426 (2007).
39. See generally Verbeure et al., supra note 7.
40. 1have, in several articles, been highly critical of the commercialization pressures that pervade
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tive that stimulates and promotes innovation. 4 1
It is certainly reasonable and appropriate for policy makers to revisit
the social utility of the tradeoff, just as Thomas Jefferson did at the inception of the system. 42 However, such a critique should be placed in the context of the overall goals of the patent system and also within the context of
the current, highly commercialized, state of biomedical research and the
healthcare delivery apparatus. 43 One might argue that the policy question at
hand here should not be whether gene patents have an impact on accessfor it seems inevitable that they will, just as they do in other domains-but
whether the tradeoff resulting from these limitations to access is, in the
aggregate, acceptable, functional, and worthwhile. 44
In this piece I take the easy way out and refrain from providing an
opinion regarding these obviously complex policy questions, questions
which engage not only issues concerning the sufficiency of evidence, but
also a wholesale analysis of social values well beyond the scope of this
short paper. But regardless of one's view on the worth of the patent system,
it seems reasonable to conclude that the gene patent debate should be informed by the best evidence possible and, to date, the available evidence is
substantially less than ideal. With this reality in mind, I consider several
issues relevant to the interpretation of existing and emerging data.
A.

The Role of the Myriad Genetics Controversy

A major conclusion from our 2006 study was that much of the international gene patent policy debate was catalyzed by the controversies surthe current research environment. See, e.g., Timothy Caulfield, Sustainability and the Balancing of the
Health Care and Innovation Agendas: The Commercialization of Genetic Research, 66 SASK. L. REV.
629 (2003); Caulfield, supra note 33.
41. One needs to be careful not to overstate the degree to which the rise of the patent regime maps
a single clear, unified, social goal. Obviously, the story of patent law is historically and philosophically
complex. Are patent rights the inevitable result of inventors' natural rights to "own" something of
his/her own creation or are they a privilege conferred by the state to stimulate innovation? For the
purposes of modem patent reform, the latter view has dominated. It is interesting to note that the type of
legal right at play (a property right versus a privilege) might also play a role in determining the level of
evidence needed to justify reform. For instance, if patents are an inherent right of inventors, the level of
evidence required to justify reform might be higher than if patents are a privilege conferred by the state.
42. The social utility of the patent system has frequently been questioned since its inception. See,
e.g., Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON.
HIST. 1,1 (1950).
43. This latter point is, I think, central. The contemporary biomedical researcher is increasingly
encouraged to invent and commercialize. As such, concern about the impact of patents on access and
cost could be viewed, in some ways, as a more general condemnation of the commercialization strategy
and the role of patents in the innovation process.
44. There is, of course, a rich literature critiquing the value of intellectual property rights. See,
e.g., Birgitte Andersen, If 'IntellectualPropertyRights 'Is the Answer, What Is the Question? Revisiting
the Patent Controversies. 13 EcON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 417, 418 (2004).
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rounding the BRCA1/2 patents and, in particular, Myriad Genetics'
sion to enforce their patent rights. 45 In the summer of 2001, Myriad
ics, the small Utah based company that owns the patents for the BRCA1/2
mutations, sent "cease and desist" letters to laboratories throughout the
world stating that all testing must be done through Myriad or one of
riad's licensees. 46 The BRCAl/2 mutations predispose women to increased
risk for breast and ovarian cancer and, at the time of the "cease and desist"
letters, testing women in particular at-risks groups was common practice
throughout the world. The Myriad testing procedure was, in general, much
47
more expensive than that being offered in publicly funded laboratories.
Thus, the "cease and desist" letters were viewed as a threat to public health
systems.48
Almost all of the international policy documents that came after the
unfolding of the controversy were dominated by references to Myriad (as
compared to other companies or gene patents), and Myriad's actions were
often used as a justification for patent reform. 4 9 There is also the possibility
that the profile of the Myriad controversy may have influenced the perceptions of clinicians regarding the potential problems regarding patents. For
example, Nicol suggests that, in Australia, the negative perceptions of clinicians regarding the impact of patents on access were probably related "to
the well-known patent enforcement actions of Myriad Genetics in other
jurisdictions and the fear of similar actions in Australia."'50 The ubiquitous
nature of the Myriad anecdote raises questions about the degree to which a
single social controversy should be able to, on its own, inform major policy
reform. Certainly, high profile cases can serve as motivators of constructive

45. Caulfield et al., supra note 11, at 1091.
46. Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L. J. 123, 141-42 (2002).
47. See id. at 135, 139.
48. Foster, supranote 2.
49. See, e.g., Caulfield et al., supra note 11, at 1093 ("The survey of policy reports reveals that the
Myriad Genetics controversy was used as a primary tool for justifying patent reform-thus highlighting
the potential of a single high-profile controversy to mobilize both governmental and non-governmental
policy makers."). Our research team also found that the Myriad story was a major news event and that
almost all the stories were negative in tone. See Caulfield et al., supra note 2, at 850. It has been noted
that:
[T]he mass media comprise the principal arena where policy-relevant issues come to the attention of decisionmakers, interest groups, and the public. Not only do the media influence
the attention of competing political actors and the public, but the media also powerfully shape
how policy issues related to biotechnology are defined and symbolized.
Matthew Nisbet & Bruce Lewenstein, Biotechnology and the American Media: The Policy Process and
the Elite Press, 1970 to 1999, 23 Scd. COMM. 359, 360 (2002).
50. Dianne Nicol, Balancing Innovation and Access to Healthcare Through the Patent SystemAn AustralianPerspective,8 COMMUNITY GENETICS 228, 230 (2005).
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change, as we have seen in the realm of research ethics. 5 1 Ideally, however,
the use of an illustrative controversy as evidence for policymakers should
be supplemented by more systematically collected supporting data.
B

The impact of existing social angst

Similarly, when reviewing the gene patent data, we need to be cognizant of how the strong moral and visceral reactions often registered against
gene patents might influence interpretations. 52 Ethics-based arguments
53
against gene patents, such as those informed by notions of human dignity,
are an important and necessary part of the dialogue, but they should not
color our view of empirical evidence. For some, gene patents are intuitively
morally reprehensible. For others, the campaign against human gene patenting debate fits well with an existing ideological agenda. 54 Indeed, in
some jurisdictions, these concerns have even led to public demonstra55
tions.
For those who hold such views about gene patents, any data that reinforces the negative image of gene patents will, unsurprisingly, be given
special attention. 56 But even if one has instinctive or ideological sympathies against gene patents, we must remember that policy development can
only stand to benefit from a rigorous and dispassionate assessment of the
value, relevance, and strength of data. This is not to say that philosophically based arguments cannot, on their own, serve as a rationale for patent
reform. Indeed, in some jurisdictions they form the foundation of several

51. See generally LAW AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REGULATION, CONFLICT OF
INTEREST, AND LIABILITY 3 (Trudo Lemmens & Duff R. Waring eds., 2006).
52. See, e.g., Mike Stott & Jill Valentine, Impact of Gene Patentingon R&D and Commerce, 21
NATURE BIOTECH. 729, 731 (2003) ("This is particularly relevant in the field of DNA patenting where

an objective analysis of the impact of patent filings on research and commercial activities readily risks
conceding ground to a subjective reaction to the whole question of gene patenting.").
53. See generally Resnik, DNA Patents, supra note 5.
54. To cite but two examples of this phenomenon: Greenpeace has argued against patenting genes
and living organisms. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, THE TRUE COST OF GENE PATENTS 4 (2004), availableat
http://weblog.greenpeace.org/ge/archives/ StudyTrue CostsGenePatents.pdf. This argument sits
well with Greenpeace's well-established, multifaceted political ideology based around animal rights and
anti-commercialization. Similarly, Jeremy Rifkin, an outspoken critic of gene patents, has broader
views about globalization and the development of technology into which his thoughts on patenting
nestle quite comfortably. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY (1998). Rifkin, for example,
believes biotechnology patents will give a handful of global corporations "unprecedented power to
dictate the terms by which we and future generations will live our lives.") Id. at 9.
55. For a sampling of powerful images from such protests, see Greenpeace Int'l., Patents on Life,
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/campaigns/genetic-engineering/ge-agriculture-and-geneticpol/ patents-on-life (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
56. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, supra note 54. This report focuses almost exclusively on the Myriad
controversy, and the Cho et al. study discussed supra text accompanying note 36.
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patent policies. 57 However, these arguments stand independent of what the
empirical evidence tells us about the impact of gene patents on innovation
and clinical access.
C.

How much evidence is needed to justify reform?

The ambiguous nature of the available research raises the interesting
question of how much data is necessary to justify patent reform. It seems
unlikely that we will ever have enough data to definitively answer all of the
questions concerning the true benefits and harms of human gene patents.
Patent reform will never be perfectly informed. As such, some have suggested that, given the importance of science and health policy, it is appropriate to act on moderately informed speculation. Gold, et al. note as
follows: "Policy makers must make their decisions here and now based on
the evidence that does exist and the best hypotheses available. The healthcare system cannot wait, for example, for the true dimensions of the anticommons problem to be clear before addressing pressing political and
social issues."'5 8 While the authors make an important point about the realities of policy making activities, it seems axiomatic that there should be, at
least, some evidence that purported problems are real. Speculation and
anecdotes may stir constructive dialogue and highlight the need for further
exploration and reflection, but they should not form the principal foundations of policy reform. To date, there is simply no good evidence that the
anti-commons problem is a profound social problem worthy of policy attention.
That said, if the issue is socially important, the harms associated with
policy inaction significant, the social norms implicated relatively malleable
(i.e., the revision of a "privilege" rather than a "right"), 59 and there is sound
speculation with at least some objective support, then policy action may be
57. See, eg., THE EUROPEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCI. AND NEW TEC.TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, OPINION ON THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF PATENTING INVENTIONS INVOLVING HUMAN
STEM CELLS, OPINION No. 16, at 16 (2002) ("[l]solated cells are so close to the human body, to the
foetus or to the embryo they have been isolated from, that their patenting may be considered as a form
of commercialisation of the human body.").
58. E. Richard Gold et al., Gene Patents-MoreEvidence Needed, but Policymakers Must Act, 25
NATURE BIOTECH. 388, 388 (2007). See also JOSEPHINE JOHNSTON & ANGELA A. WASUNNA,

PATENTS,

BIOMEDICAL

RESEARCH,

AND

TREATMENTS:

EXAMINING

CONCERNS,

CANVASSING

SOLUTIONS S 14 (2007) ("Until better evidence of the actual impact of patents on research exists, and in
light of the potential for patent infringement lawsuits, the risk that patents may slow or prevent research
ought to be taken seriously.").
59. For instance, if a patent is a "right", rather than a privilege conferred by the State, perhaps a
higher evidentiary standard would be required to justify any erosion of the "right". For a discussion of
the right versus privilege debate, see Mossoff, supra note 14, at 953; Hans Morten Haugen, Intellectual
Property--Rightsor Privileges?,8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 445, 445 (2005).
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warranted even when good evidence is absent. The problem in the context
of gene patent reform, at least in response to the "anti-commons" concern,
is that the evidence regarding all of these conditions is far from solid. 60 In
addition, we do not have adequate evidence regarding the benefits of gene
61
patents and the adverse implications of altering the existing system.
Would patent reform, in the aggregate, do more harm than good? At least
some in the community, rightly or not, believe that patents have played a
tremendously constructive and important role. 62 These views, and any evidence relevant to the perspective, must also be weighed in the policy
process.
IV. CONCLUSION

The modest goal of this short comment is to question the degree to
which existing evidence supports the calls for patent reform. Naturally, this
is a tremendously complex topic and it would be naive to assume that the
concerns about gene patents turn only on the impact of patents on upstream
research and downstream access. 63 However, these are two of the most
commonly heard justifications for reform. 64 As such, it seems reasonable to
analyze what the evidence tells us about them. Moreover, an exploration of
the evidence reminds us to consider the degree to which initial speculation
about social harm (or, for that matter, benefit) is playing out. This should,
indeed, be a primary goal of ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) research-that is, working with interdisciplinary teams to produce data about
what is really going on.
60. While beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the evidence regarding the value
of genetic technologies is far from overwhelming. Thus, even the importance of the issue, in a broad
society sense, can also be contested. Though I believe genetic research is tremendously socially valuable, is it more so than other areas where traditional patent rules prevail. For a critique of emerging
genetic technologies, see A. Cecile, J.W. Janssens et al., A CriticalAppraisal of the Scientific Basis of
Commercial Genomic Profiles Used to Assess Health Risks and Personalize Health Interventions, 82
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 593 (2008).
61. See Holman, supra note 28, at 361 ("Without more compelling evidence of an overwhelming
negative impact in contexts that are critical to the public good, there is no adequate justification for
rushing into a radical legislative fix that might have substantial unintended negative consequences.").
62. See, e.g., Martin Bobrow & Sandy Thomas, Patents in a Genetic Age, 409 NATURE 763, 763
(2001) ("In helping to develop many discoveries into clinically useful products, the patent system has
been a force for good. It has encouraged innovation and sensible risk taking, stimulated investment in
research and development, and delivered drugs and devices that have changed the face of modem
medicine.").
63. As noted at the start of this paper, there are many other social concerns associated with gene
patents. The evidence associated with each one of these concerns should also be considered. For example, there is at least some evidence that biotech patents are correlated with the withholding of scientific
information. David Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life Sciences:
Prevalancesand Predictors,81 ACAD. MED. 137, 137 (2006).
64. See, e.g., Caulfield et al., supra note 11, at 1092; Verbeure et al., supra note 7, at 29, 32, 33.

